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RESEARCH
A small proportion of air travelers make disproportion-
ately more journeys than the rest of travelers. They also 
tend to interact predominantly with other frequent travelers 
in hotels and airport lounges. This group has the potential to 
accelerate global spread of infectious respiratory diseases. 
Using an epidemiologic model, we simulated exportation of 
cases from severe acute respiratory syndrome–like and in-
ﬂ  uenza-like epidemics in a population for which a small pro-
portion travel more frequently than the rest. Our simulations 
show that frequent travelers accelerate international spread 
of epidemics only if they are infected early in an outbreak 
and the outbreak does not expand rapidly. If the epidemic 
growth rate is high, as is likely for pandemic inﬂ  uenza, het-
erogeneities in travel are frequently overwhelmed by the 
large number of infected persons in the majority population 
and the resulting high probability that some of these per-
sons will take an international ﬂ  ight.
I
n today’s world of increasing air travel for both business 
and pleasure, a small proportion of persons make dispro-
portionately more journeys than the rest of the population 
(1,2). These frequent ﬂ  iers tend to travel for business pur-
poses and mix predominantly with other business travelers, 
stay in particular hotels, and use speciﬁ  c airport lounges. 
This form of assortative (like with like) mixing means a re-
spiratory infection could potentially spread quickly within 
this group and thus be disseminated rapidly between coun-
tries. This rapid spread was illustrated early in the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003. The 
index SARS case in Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, People’s Republic of China, stayed in a hotel and 
infected 16 persons there. Of these patients with second-
ary cases, 6 took international ﬂ  ights to Australia, Canada, 
Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam (3). The arrival of 
these infected persons subsequently led to SARS outbreaks 
in Hanoi, Singapore, and Toronto within a few days of the 
ﬁ  rst case in Hong Kong.
Recent studies of the role of international air travel on 
the spread of infectious diseases have highlighted the role 
of heterogeneities in the connectedness of different airports 
(4–6), the length of the latent period of the disease in rela-
tion to the duration of the ﬂ  ight (7), the possible role of 
travel restrictions (8–11) and the role of cooperative strate-
gies to control international spread of pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
(10,12). To date, none of these studies has taken into ac-
count the effects of heterogeneity in the frequency of travel 
between persons and the potential role of such heterogene-
ity on the global spread of a directly transmitted infectious 
agent. Also of interest is whether targeting interventions 
speciﬁ  cally at frequent travelers would slow the interna-
tional spread of a deﬁ  ned pathogen.
Methods
To investigate the role of frequent travelers in the ex-
portation of asymptomatic cases during the early stages of 
an epidemic, we simulated outbreaks of both a SARS-like 
and an inﬂ  uenza-like airborne respiratory infection in a 
population in which a small proportion of the population 
make many more trips than the rest of the population. In 
the early stages of an epidemic, chance events are impor-
tant because the number of infected persons is small. We 
simulated these early stages by using a stochastic model for 
which every simulation is different. We present both the 
mean behavior of the simulations and the range of possible 
outcomes across a large number of simulations. In a sto-
chastic model, introduction of 1 infected person has a ﬁ  nite 
probability of resulting in the rapid extinction of an infec-
tious disease. To increase the probability of initiating an 
outbreak, we introduced 3 asymptomatic persons into the 
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population. We simulated the outbreak in a large extended 
metropolitan area with a population of 107 persons.
The structure of the model is illustrated schematically 
in Figure 1A. The population is divided into 2 subpopu-
lations with different frequencies of taking international 
ﬂ  ights. A small proportion of the population, r, are high-
frequency ﬂ  iers. Most of the population, 1 – r, are low-
frequency ﬂ  iers. Frequent ﬂ  iers have contact with other 
frequent ﬂ  iers and with the general population. Similarly, 
the general population has contact with persons in the gen-
eral population and with frequent ﬂ  iers. Contacts are more 
likely to be between persons within each group (frequent 
ﬂ  iers or general population), but the level of this assorta-
tiveness may vary (parameterized by φ). Contacts may be 
made completely randomly, with the likelihood of meet-
ing a person from the frequent-ﬂ  ying group or the general 
population being proportional to the number of persons in 
each population (φ = 1). At the other extreme, persons may 
only have contact with other persons in the same group 
(φ = 0). The true mixing pattern is likely to lie between 
these 2 extremes.
The extent to which the high-frequency and low-fre-
quency ﬂ  iers mix will determine how quickly a disease will 
spread from the general population to the frequent ﬂ  iers 
and vice versa. We simulated the model for a selection of 
mixing parameters, ranging from wholly random (φ = 1) 
to moderate and high levels of assortativeness (φ = 0.5, 
0.25, respectively). For comparison, we also simulated a 
homogeneous model in which the entire population travels 
equally frequently.
The outbreak is modeled by dividing the population 
into those who are still susceptible to the disease, those 
who have contracted the disease and are in the latent stage, 
those who are infectious and symptomatic, and those who 
have recovered from the disease (Figure 1). This division is 
similar to the basic structure used in several recent papers 
on the role of international travel in the spread of infectious 
diseases (8,9,12). This model structure can be adapted to 
many airborne infections because it allows for an asymp-
tomatic period, which may or may not be infectious, fol-
lowed by a potentially symptomatic period during which 
transmission can also occur.
In our stochastic model, events (such as infection or a 
person leaving the source area) occur by chance. For exam-
ple, the time after symptom onset at which a person recov-
ers from infection with SARS is not a ﬁ  xed quantity; rather, 
it is a randomly chosen time from an exponential probabil-
ity distribution with a mean of 10 days. Table 1 shows the 
average latent and infectious periods used. The probability 
of leaving the country is constant for all persons (Table 1). 
The probability of a susceptible person becoming infected 
increases as a larger proportion of the population becomes 
infected and is chosen so that the average number of new 
infections caused by each infected person in the early stages 
of the epidemic is equal to the basic reproductive number 
R0 (2.5 for SARS, 1.8 for inﬂ  uenza; Table 1). The epidemic 
is simulated by evaluating the probability that any person 
is infected, becomes symptomatic, or recovers in any short 
time interval (we divide time into sequential short intervals 
of one ﬁ  ftieth of a day), and then testing whether that event 
occurs. The simulation can be thought of as generating a 
random number between 0 and 1 for each person in each 
time step. If this random number is less than the probability 
of a particular event occurring to that person, then the event 
occurs. Otherwise, the person is left in his or her current 
state. The model does not store the details of every person 
separately but keeps track of the  number of persons who 
are susceptible (S), latently infected (E), infectious (I), and 
recovered (R) at any point in time. As events occur, these 
variables change. For example, when a person becomes in-
fected, S decreases by 1 and E increases by 1. Because the 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the model structure. Black 
boxes represent infectious stages and arrows indicate that persons in 
these stages are allowed to ﬂ  y. A) Severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
Persons with latent infections are not infectious, and all infectious 
persons are symptomatic and prevented from traveling. B) Possible 
scenario for pandemic inﬂ   uenza. Persons with latent infections 
are infectious, and a proportion (1 – s) of infectious persons are 
asymptomatic and allowed to travel (indicated by the dotted arrows). 
The size of the arrows indicates that the persons in the high-frequency 
ﬂ  ier group have a higher probability of ﬂ  ying per day.RESEARCH
events occur by chance, the total number of persons  who 
are in each state, including the number of infected persons 
taking ﬂ  ights, varies stochastically.
In our model, we assume that those who are in the la-
tent stage of the disease are not infectious for SARS and 
inﬂ  uenza. This is generally accepted to be a good model 
for SARS because isolation of symptomatic persons pre-
vented onward transmission of SARS, which indicated that 
the latent period has limited or no infectivity (15). We also 
assume that all infectious persons are symptomatic. This 
is a conservative assumption, but serosurveillance studies 
for SARS have shown low prevalence of seropositivity in 
persons who did not show symptoms of disease (16–21). 
Lastly, we assume that all symptomatic persons are pre-
vented from traveling because of symptom severity or ef-
fective screening. The model equations are shown in the 
online Technical Appendix (available from www.cdc.gov/
EID/content/13/9/1288-Techapp.pdf).
The disease course of a possible future inﬂ  uenza pan-
demic is not known. However, studies of previous pandem-
ics and seasonal epidemics suggest a possible scenario in 
which the latent period of inﬂ  uenza may be infectious and 
not all infected persons will show symptoms (14,22–24). 
This means that a larger proportion of cases could be al-
lowed to travel on international ﬂ  ights, even with 100% 
effective screening, because they are asymptomatically in-
fected (Figure 1, panel B). We have modeled a conservative 
scenario, in which inﬂ  uenza has a disease life history similar 
to that of SARS, but with shorter latent and infectious peri-
ods (Table 1). The inclusion of partially effective screening 
or, equivalently, the inclusion of asymptomatic cases would 
lead to more cases being exported than is shown here.
Little data are available across a population for the 
relative frequency of ﬂ  ying. The mean probability of ﬂ  y-
ing for the whole population can be approximated by the 
number of airline passengers divided by the population of 
a country or city. This calculation gives estimates of 0.005 
for Hong Kong, 0.0005 for Beijing, and 0.0002 for Thai-
land (9). We modeled a population of 10 million persons 
with a 0.005 probability of ﬂ  ying per day as an example of 
an outbreak in a well-connected city. A study on domestic 
ﬂ  ying in Norway suggested that ≈2% of a survey popula-
tion who take domestic ﬂ  ights in Norway make >20 jour-
neys a year (1). This survey did not include persons who do 
not take ﬂ  ights. Therefore, the proportion of the total popu-
lation who make this many journeys is likely to be lower. 
On the basis of this data, we present results for a population 
in which 1% of the population travel 20× more frequently 
than the rest of the population and discuss results for differ-
ent values of these parameters.
We investigated the effect of setting where the out-
break is initiated by using 2 scenarios. In the ﬁ  rst scenario, 
the outbreak begins among the general, infrequently ﬂ  y-
ing population. Cases subsequently occur among high-
frequency ﬂ  iers as a result of contact between the 2 sub-
populations. The mean time until the ﬁ  rst high-frequency 
ﬂ  ier becomes infected is a function of the incidence rate 
in the main population and level of mixing between the 2 
groups. In the second scenario, the outbreak begins among 
the high-frequency ﬂ  iers. The disease again spreads to the 
main population because of contacts between the groups, 
with the mean time until this occurs being a function of 
the incidence rate in the main population and the level of       
mixing between the 2 groups.
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Table 1. Parameter descriptions and values for epidemiologic model that simulates exportation of cases from SARS-like and 
influenza-like epidemics* 
Value (reference) 
Description Parameter SARS Influenza
Infection
  Basic reproductive number  R0 2.5 (13)1 . 8  ( 14)
 Latent  period,  d  TL 4 (13)1 . 5 ( 14)
  Infectious period, d  TI 10 (13)1 . 1  ( 14)
 Generation  time,  d  Tg = TL + TI 14 2.6
  Epidemic doubling time, d  td = Tg/ (R0 – 1) ln2  6.5 2.3
International travel 
  Proportion of population who are high-frequency fliers  r 0–0.5
 Mixing  between  groups:  φ = 1, random mixing; φ = 0,  
 assortative  mixing 
φ 0–1
  Relative probability of flying of high-frequency fliers  f 20
  Mean probability of flying per day  ε 0.005 (9)
  Probability of flying per day of high-frequency fliers  εH = f / 1 + (f – 1)r ε 0.084
  Probability of flying per day of low-frequency fliers  εL = 1 / 1 + (f – 1)r ε 0.042
Probability of a case being exported 
  Homogeneous flying patterns  L = TLε 0.02 0.008
 High-frequency  fliers  lH = TLεH 0.34 0.13
 Low-frequency  fliers  lL = TLεL 0.017 0.006
*SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. Frequent Travelers and Spread of Epidemics
The mean cumulative number of cases exported (across 
50,000 simulations) is presented for both SARS-like and 
inﬂ  uenza-like parameters (Table 1), for initiation of the 
epidemic among the low-frequency and high-frequency ﬂ  i-
ers, and for a range of mixing between the high-frequency 
and low-frequency travelers. We also illustrate variability 
in simulated outcomes by presenting snapshots of the dis-
tributions of the cumulative number of exported cases.
Results
As an epidemic progresses, the cumulative number of 
cases increases, and therefore the number of asymptomatic 
cases exported from a source area increases for all travel 
patterns (Figure 2). If a SARS-like epidemic is seeded in 
the group of frequent ﬂ  iers, then the initial rate of inter-
national spread is accelerated relative to the rate for the 
homogeneous case (Figure 2, panel A, open symbols). If 
the frequent travelers contract the infection early, more ex-
clusivity of mixing (smaller φ) serves to speed international 
spread, and this effect may last well into the epidemic (Fig-
ure 2, panel A, open triangles). If the epidemic is initiated 
in the low-frequency ﬂ  iers, the mean number of exported 
cases is similar to results of the homogeneous model (Fig-
ure 2, panel A, closed symbols). Heterogeneities in travel 
patterns increase the variability between simulated epidem-
ics; higher variability results from more assortative mixing           
(Table 2; online Appendix Figure 1, available from www.
cdc.gov/EID/content/13/9/1288-appG1.htm).
In an outbreak in which the infection spreads rapidly, 
such as could potentially occur with pandemic inﬂ  uenza A 
(Figure 2, panel B), heterogeneities in travel patterns have 
less effect on the rate of exportation of cases early in the 
epidemic than they would for SARS (Figure 2, panel A), 
particularly after the ﬁ  rst weeks of the epidemic. The over-
all pattern of the exportation of cases is similar for SARS 
and inﬂ  uenza, but the time scale for inﬂ  uenza is much 
shorter because of the short doubling time (Table 1). For 
example, the number of exported cases is in the thousands 
for inﬂ  uenza by day 50 (Figure 2, panel B), when it is <20 
for SARS (Figure 2, panel A).
Later in an epidemic, the mean number of exported 
cases is similar, regardless of where the epidemic is seed-
ed or the mixing patterns of the high-frequency ﬂ  iers and 
low-frequency ﬂ  iers (Figure 2, panel B, inset for inﬂ  uenza, 
not shown for SARS). The variability between simulated 
epidemics becomes large, with some simulations resulting 
in hundreds of exported cases and many resulting in only 
a few exported cases (Table 2; online Appendix Figure 1, 
panel D).
Heterogeneities in travel patterns increase the number 
of exported cases to a greater extent and for a longer period 
if the relative frequency of ﬂ  ying of the high-frequency ﬂ  i-
ers, f, is higher or if the proportion of the population who are 
high-frequency ﬂ  iers, r, is smaller (online Appendix Figure 
2, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/9/1288-
appG2.htm) because the probability that any frequent ﬂ  ier 
will ﬂ  y per day is higher (Table 1, εH). However, if r be-
comes small, the epidemic among this group peaks and 
then decreases quickly because of the limited number in 
the group. In this case, the period in which there are enough 
infected persons in this group who can contribute to an in-
creased rate of spread of exportation of cases is short (on-
line Appendix Figure 2, panel B).
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Figure 2. Mean number of cases exported from a single simulated 
source epidemic for severe acute respiratory syndrome–like 
parameters (A) and inﬂ   uenza-like parameters (B) (50,000 runs; 
parameters are listed in Table 1). Results are shown for a population 
in which everyone travels equally frequently (homogeneous model, 
circles), for a population in which 1% travel 20 times more frequently 
than the rest of the population, and for the 2 populations mixing 
randomly (φ = 1, squares), for moderate levels of mixing between 
the groups (φ = 0.5, diamonds), and for low levels of mixing in which 
most contacts are assortative (φ = 0.25, triangles). The ﬁ  rst cases 
are either in the majority population of low-frequency ﬂ  iers (solid 
symbols) or high-frequency ﬂ  iers (open symbols). Inset in B shows 
a greater range on the y-axis. Variability about these means is 
shown in Table 2 and online Appendix Figure 1.RESEARCH
Discussion
The probability that an infected person will make an 
international ﬂ  ight while still incubating infection and non-
symptomatic is higher for a high-frequency ﬂ  ier than for a 
low-frequency ﬂ  ier (Table 1). In the early stages of an epi-
demic in which most cases occur in high-frequency ﬂ  iers, 
the expected number of cases exported will therefore be 
higher than if the early cases occur in predominantly low-
frequency ﬂ  iers (Figure 2). Heterogeneity in ﬂ  ying patterns 
also increases the variability between simulated outbreaks 
(Table 2; online Appendix Figure 1).
Wherever the epidemic is initially concentrated, the 
disease will spread to all parts of the population because of 
contacts between persons in both groups. The speed with 
which this occurs will be a function of the level of mix-
ing between the groups. If high-frequency ﬂ  iers mix almost 
exclusively among themselves, they are unlikely to acquire 
cases early in an epidemic in which the ﬁ  rst cases emerge 
in the general population. If, however, they contract the in-
fection early, this exclusivity serves to speed international 
spread and this effect may last well into the epidemic (Fig-
ure 2, open triangles). If mixing is less assortative, then 
the epidemic will spread to the general population more 
rapidly. Because most of the population are low-frequency 
ﬂ  iers, the number of infected persons in the main popula-
tion will quickly exceed those in the small group of high-
frequency ﬂ  iers.
When the number of cases becomes large, the expect-
ed number of exported cases (which may be approximated 
as the probability of ﬂ  ying while asymptomatic multiplied 
by cumulative incidence [9]) will be large, even if the prob-
ability that any person travels is small. Once the epidemic 
takes hold in the general population, the number of cases 
being exported from the majority low-frequency ﬂ  ier popu-
lation exceeds those being exported from the much smaller 
group of high-frequency ﬂ  iers. Regardless of where most   
initial cases occur, the contribution of high-frequency ﬂ  iers 
to international spread is eventually overwhelmed by the 
large epidemic in the general population, despite their lower 
probability of ﬂ  ying per day. Thus, the average behavior of 
epidemics is eventually similar, whether they start in high-
frequency ﬂ  iers, or in groups with no heterogeneities in 
travel (Figure 2, panel B, inset), but the variability between 
simulations is large (Table 2; online Appendix Figure 1).
The latent period for inﬂ  uenza is likely to be shorter 
than that for SARS, which reduces the probability that any 
infected person will travel before exhibiting symptoms 
(Table 1). However, the doubling time for an inﬂ  uenza pan-
demic is less than half that for SARS because of the much 
shorter generation time for inﬂ  uenza (Table 1). Therefore, 
the number of cases exported from a local inﬂ  uenza epidem-
ic will increase far more rapidly than those from a SARS 
epidemic (Figure 2, panel B). This rapid growth means that 
any increased rate of export caused by early concentration 
1292  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 9, September 2007
Table 2. Variability between runs in an epidemiologic model that simulates exportation of cases from SARS-like and influenza-like
epidemics*
No. cases exported, mean, median (5th–95th percentile) 




0, 0 (0–0)  0, 0 (0–1)  1, 0 (0–3)  3, 1 (0–7)  7, 5 (1–16) 
High 1, 0 (0–2)  2, 0 (0–2)  2, 1 (0–3)  4, 2 (1–7)  7, 5 (2–14)  Random mixing 
Low  0, 0 (0–0)  0, 0 (0–1)  1, 0 (0–3)  3, 1 (0–6)  7, 5 (1–15) 
High 2, 1 (0–3)  3, 2 (1–4)  4 (3, 1–7)  6 (4, 2–12)  9, 7 (2–20)  Moderately 
assortative Low  0, 0 (0–0)  0, 0 (0–1)  1, 0 (0–2)  3, 1 (0–6)  7, 5 (0–15) 
High 2, 1 (0–3)  4, 2 (1–7)  5, 5 (2–13)  10, 8 (3–22)  16, 12 (4–38)  Highly




1, 0 (0–1)  8, 5 (0–20)  107, 85 (1–251)  1,268, 1,069
(7–3,118) 
15,729, 13,541  
(73–35,132) 
High 1, 0 (0–2)  7, 5 (0–18)  89, 74 (1–233)  1,341, 940
(1–3,049) 
14,592, 11,990  
(1–35,632) 
Random mixing 
Low  0, 0 (0–1)  7, 5 (0–18)  95, 78 (1– 246)  1,264, 1,057
(7–3,256) 
15,668, 13,651  
(74– 35,231) 
High 2, 0 (0–3)  8, 6 (0–32)  93, 72 (1–231)  1,288, 1,138
(1–3,387) 




Low  1, 0 (0–1)  7, 5 (0–20)  104, 83 (0–264)  1,411, 1,213
(0–3,526) 
17,081, 15,850  
(0–35,403) 
High 3, 2 (0–7)  15, 10 (2–41)  106, 81 (2–291)  1,166, 840
(2–2,923) 




Low  0, 0 (0–2)  12, 0 (0–33)  164, 139 (0–246)  1,312, 967
(1–3,231) 
16,592, 12,607  
(28–36,643) 
*Means are shown in Figure 2 and distributions in online Appendix Figure 1. SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. Frequent Travelers and Spread of Epidemics
of infection among the high-frequency ﬂ  iers will be quick-
ly overcome by the number of cases being exported from 
the general population (Figure 2, panel B), which indicates 
that heterogeneities in travel have little effect.
We have simulated an outbreak in a single population 
by using a relatively simple model. Similar models have 
been used for the dynamics of single epidemics in a net-
work of countries or areas connected by a complex airline 
network (6,8,12), and more complex, person-based, with-
in-country models have been used to simulate epidemics 
within smaller groups of countries (10,14). Our results 
show that in the event of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic, inter-
ventions such as travel restrictions will have to be imple-
mented rapidly and effectively to have a substantial effect 
(8–10,12). We have shown that high-frequency ﬂ  iers have 
the potential to spread infection even more rapidly than 
previously indicated by models that assume homogenous 
travel behavior.
Our study and the relatively simple structure of the 
model were limited by the lack of available data on the 
travel patterns of persons. Travel patterns may vary with 
age, sex, occupation, and district or country of origin. To 
increase our knowledge of these patterns, existing surveys 
of airline passengers at airports could be extended to ask 
additional questions on number of journeys per year. How-
ever, these surveys would necessarily omit those persons 
who do not take international ﬂ  ights, who are believed to 
make up a large proportion of many populations. Any addi-
tional information could be valuable for assessing the risk 
for international spread of diseases from affected areas.
The SARS epidemic in Hong Kong satisﬁ  ed the cri-
teria we have identiﬁ  ed for frequent travelers to accelerate 
the  international spread of an outbreak. The ﬁ  rst case-pa-
tient with SARS in Hong Kong had contact with other fre-
quent travelers in a hotel and seeded the epidemic in high-
frequency travelers. However, SARS has long incubation 
and infectious periods and only moderate transmissibility. 
For inﬂ  uenza A, which has much shorter incubation and in-
fectious periods, such heterogeneities have a limited effect 
on the rate of exportation of cases. Because frequent travel-
ers play a role mainly in the early stages of an epidemic, 
targeting interventions to these persons is unlikely to be an 
effective control strategy because such a plan would have 
to be in place almost immediately.
Finally, estimates of the rate of international spread of 
respiratory infections that do not consider heterogeneities 
in behavior may be misleading. If an outbreak begins in a 
rural area, where persons have a low probability of travel-
ing abroad and mixing with frequent ﬂ  iers, the time until 
cases are exported is longer than in outbreaks in which fre-
quent travelers contract infection early in the course of the 
outbreak. When combined with the vagaries of chance ear-
ly in the evolution of a new epidemic and the complexities 
of the international airline network, this variability makes 
early prediction of the pattern and speed of global spread 
difﬁ  cult. This difﬁ  culty in predicting whether a particular 
country is likely to import cases from a currently unknown 
source area highlights the need for developing a strategy 
for controlling an outbreak caused by imported cases.
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Midnight Cave, Texas: 
The Experiment
   —  For  Michel  Siffre
Al Zolynas
A man descends into a cave
long abandoned by bats. For six months
the electrodes and wires of science
bristle from his head.
in the dark chest of the earth,
a hundred feet beneath the seasons
and with no clock but
the wound timepiece of himself,
he seeks his own rhythms.
Above him colleagues monitor
his vital functions
and turn the lights on
and off at his request.
His dreams, of course, are his own,
part of the self’s short-circuit,
not to be monitored by the surface crew.
After the 130th cycle
there are no days), after waking
in panic in absolute darkness,
he writes, “When you ﬁ  nd yourself
alone, isolated
in a world totally without time,
face-to-face with yourself, all
the masks that you hide behind——
those that preserve your own illusions,
those that protect them before others——
ﬁ  nally fall, sometimes brutally.”
The man sits on a rock
in the circle of light
around his pale-blue tent
for a succession of eternities
swaying mindlessly. He daydreams
of the dense jungles of Guatemala,
the sunlight ﬁ  ltering
through wet leaves. His boyhood
fantasy of ﬁ  nding Mayan relics
somehow sustains him:
“I will go to Central America
and I will regain control of my soul.”
On the ﬂ  oor of the cave
the dust of ancient bat guano
ﬁ  lters, particle by ﬁ  ne particle,
through itself.
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